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GREENBACKS, CONSENT, AND UNWRITTEN
AMENDMENTS
John M. Bickers*
I remember a German farmer expressing as much in a few
words as the whole subject requires: “money is money, and
paper is paper.”—All the invention of man cannot make them
otherwise. The alchymist may cease his labours, and the
hunter after the philosopher’s stone go to rest, if paper
cannot be metamorphosed into gold and silver, or made to
answer the same purpose in all cases.1

INTRODUCTION
Every day Americans spend paper money, using it as legal
tender. Yet the Constitution makes no mention of this
phenomenon. Indeed, it clearly prevents the states from having
the authority to make paper money into legal tender, and does not
award this power to Congress.2 Yet today, without a formal
written amendment to the Constitution, America seems united in
accepting this fact to a degree that greatly exceeds our unity in the
vast majority of Constitutional questions that might appear. The
acceptance by the people today of a power at odds with the
original meaning of our Constitution offers insights into the
legitimacy of the process of unwritten amendments to the
founding document and the continuing meaning of the consent of
the governed.

*
Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
My profound thanks for their suggestions and encouragement go out to Professors Mark
Graber, Stephen Griffin, and Sanford Levinson, as well as to Richard Albert, Ryan Williams,
and Yaniv Roznai for including a draft of this paper in their symposium. I am indebted also
to the research assistance of Dani Ingram-Farris as well as Mike Mannheimer, Ken Katkin,
and the rest of my colleagues at the Salmon P. Chase College of Law.
1. THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON GOVERNMENT, THE AFFAIRS OF THE BANK,
AND PAPER MONEY 44 (1817) (emphasis added).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 8, 10.
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I. WHOSE VOICE MATTERS?
A problem has lived long at the heart of originalism. The
idea that the Constitution of 1787, whether in the minds of those
who drafted it,3 or in its meaning to the public of the day,4 should
control all successive generations fits uneasily with one of the
core ideas of republican government,5 for if that form of
government, especially in its American form, has a consistent
theoretical basis, it is that governmental legitimacy arises “from
the Consent of the Governed.”6
Of course, originalism has many defenders, and many foes,
in the world of legal scholarship.7 This Article will forego all of

3. Typically this idea is now called “original intent” jurisprudence because it focuses
on the intent the Framers had for their new government. See, e.g., Jacobus ten Broek, Use
by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27
CALIF. L. REV. 399, 399-400 (1939) (noting that the Supreme Court consistently announced
“that the end and object of constitutional construction is the discovery of the intention of
those persons who formulated the instrument”). Not that long ago, what are now described
as types of originalism tended to be gathered together under the label “interpretivism.” See,
e.g. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 782 (1983) (“Such norms are found by
interpreting the text, with recourse when necessary to the intent of the framers.”).
4. This is often labeled “original public meaning” jurisprudence. See, e.g., James C.
Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make
Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21, 21-22 (2016); see, e.g., H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 935 (1985)
(“Madison’s interpretive theory rested primarily on the distinction he drew between the
public meaning or intent of a state paper, a law, or a constitution, and the personal opinions
of the individuals who had written or adopted it.”). For the purposes of this Article, the two
forms of originalism are equally subject to the concerns expressed.
5. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 507 (1994) (noting that “[a] fundamental principle for
republican government was that the majority should rule”).
6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[T]o secure these
Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent
of the Governed.”). At least one modern scholar, though, rejects the view that the
Declaration’s invocation was meant to require popular governance, instead locating the
source of the power with those who govern. See Randy E. Barnett, The Declaration of
Independence and the American Theory of Government: “First Come Rights, and Then
Comes Government,” 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 27 (2019) (“It is the matter of ‘who
governs’ that the Declaration says is to be decided by ‘the consent of the governed.’”).
7. The battle is both legal and political, but seldom appears in historical scholarship.
See, e.g., ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING xxiv (2019) (“Whether the courts should
base decisions on ‘originalism’ is a political, not a historical, question. But no historian
believes that any important document possesses a single intent or meaning.”).
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the routine objections to originalism,8 focusing instead on a
conundrum closer to the core of the originalist project. What
theory of government allows a change to Jefferson’s “self
evident” principal that the earth belongs to the living?9 Thus,
originalism has long faced a “dead hand” problem: why should
the understanding of the Constitution of those long dead bind us,
their heirs?10 As Professor Moore noted in defending textualism
from intent-based originalism, such a method has the vice of
binding us to “old ideals.”11
As Jefferson was aware, treating the ordering of society as a
matter to be decided once meant that future generations would
lose control of their own destiny.12 As he noted to Madison, the
8. Frequently raised objections to one form of originalism or another include: the
difficulty of reconstructing the beliefs and understandings of a vanished time and the
variance of opinions among the contemporaries whose views we are seeking, see, e.g.,
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
24, 77 (1992) (“[O]ne must plumb the fictional ‘mind’ of a long-dead multi-member body.”);
see also Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1213 (2008)
(“[T]here are elements of this lack of historical consciousness in contemporary originalism.
Judges and scholars speak of the founding generation as if they were our contemporaries.”);
the utter inability of originalism to deliver on its supposed primary advantage, “an
interpretive approach that avoided judicial subjectivity, judgment, and choice,” Mark
Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 616 (2008); or the vastly
different makeup of “the People” then and “the People” today, see, e.g., Amar supra note 5,
at 508 (“Women today constitute a majority of both the Massachusetts and American
polities. They are today governed under a federal Constitution largely the making of men
who died long ago, men who may not have had their interests foremost in mind.”). It has
even been noted that some difficulties arise from the fact that translations of the Constitution
into German and Dutch made available in the key states of Pennsylvania and New York did
not agree. See Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST.
COMMENT. 71, 78-79 (2016) (considering a number of possible approaches to the different
translations, and using them to demonstrate that “articulating the original public meaning is
not a simple job of reporting what happened at a certain magical moment in time. It is a
theoretical and selective reconstruction of elements of the past, brought to the present and
employed in the present for present-day purposes.”).
9. Thomas Jefferson, II. Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press
1958).
10. Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—in Theory and Practice, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2009).
11. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
277, 357 (1985) (“Better that we fill out the grand clauses of the Constitution by our notions
of meaning (evolving, as we have seen, in light of our developing theories about the world),
by our notions of morals, and by two hundred years of precedent. . . . The dead hand of the
past ought not to govern, for example, our treatment of the liberty of free speech, and any
theory of interpretation that demands that it does is a bad theory.”).
12. Jefferson, supra note 9, at 392-93.
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logical conclusion was that “no society can make a perpetual
constitution, or even a perpetual law.”13 Of course, as Madison
recognized, perpetually remaking the fundamental laws of society
would make the nation “too mutable” to hold onto its benefits,
and it might too easily fall victim to “pernicious factions.”14
Madison’s strongest rejoinder, though, was that the stalwarts of
the past had not merely lived on the earth; they had improved it,
and it was perfectly just to find that their successors would be
obligated to pay the debt of honoring the intentions of those
whose improvements benefitted the current generation.15
But Madison declined to find in this principle support for a
sort of divine right theory of originalism.16 Instead, he returned
to the consent of the governed, finding a clear path to reconciling
republican virtue with respect for the improvements of
preexisting laws: tacit consent.17 As Madison noted, presuming
the consent of those who participate in a society was the only way
to avoid either a requirement of unanimity among society’s
current members or the need to reenact every rule each time a new
citizen reached the age of majority.18
As is so often the case, Madison’s common-sense
philosophy has been incorporated into the sinews of American
society. At least when the people do not live in one of the
revolutionary, government-altering generations,19 they can only
consent passively, through the ordinary acts that every day
provide countless opportunities to accept or reject the system of
government they have inherited.20 Yet this very fact creates a
13. Id. at 395-96.
14. James Madison, To Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, 18, 19 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., Univ. Press of Va. 1981).
15. Id. at 19-20.
16. See id.
17. “I find no relief from these consequences, but in the received doctrine that a tacit
assent may be given to established Constitutions and laws, and that this assent may be
inferred, where no positive dissent appears.” Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
18. See id. at 21.
19. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 7-8 (1998).
20. See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 165, 189 (2008) (“Implied consent is consent to a government as it actually operates:
if one implicitly consents to the government’s authority, one does so by living under its
existing rules. Accordingly, implied consent to the present constitutional regime could only
establish the propriety of governance based on original constitutional meanings if the
existing rules of American governance corresponded to such original meanings.”).
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problem for originalism: what if a widely held current view, one
receiving a large degree of tacit assent, is wrong from the
perspective of the 1780s? Several originalist projects have argued
that some ideas have just been mistaken over the years, resulting
in government behavior that is unconstitutional.21 Our obligation,
proponents of originalism sometimes argue, is to choose one of
two paths: cease the behavior, or amend the Constitution.22 The
first generation of originalists included those, like Raoul Berger
and Robert Bork, who argued that Article V of the Constitution
provided a fully sufficient response to the “dead hand” problem.23
Some recent scholars have argued that the fealty to the
amendment process is critical to the preservation of liberty.24
Non-originalist scholars have rejected this path, based in some
measure on the value of the popular consent embodied in the
Declaration of Independence.25 Many accept fully that the
21. As an obvious example, scholars in the late twentieth century argued that the thencurrent idea that the Second Amendment was not directed to protecting an individual right
was incorrect, see, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 793, 810 (1998); see also Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New
Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1141 (1996) (“Research
conducted through the 1980s has led legal scholars and historians to conclude, sometimes
reluctantly, but with virtual unanimity, that there is no tenable textual or historical argument
against a broad individual right view of the Second Amendment.”). But, c.f., Paul Finkelman,
The Living Constitution and the Second Amendment: Poor History, False Originalism, and
A Very Confused Court, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 661 (2015) (arguing that in adopting an
individual rights view of the Second Amendment, the “Court has embraced a modern
interpretation of the Constitution”).
22. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611,
619 (1999).
23. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1406.
24. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 22, at 654 (noting that a written constitution “is
conducive to preserving the rights of the people from infringement by government officials,
but only if its original meaning is not contradicted or altered without adhering to formal
amendment procedures”) (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2009) (“The
proposition that, absent open revolution, we may change an ancient Constitution only
through the onerous and constitutionally endogenous Article V process is both undemocratic
and unattractive.”); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 65
(2009) (“The grant of an exclusive power to change the constitutional text is logically
compatible with a practice in which the text’s meaning can change over time. Judicial power
to engage in non-originalist constitutional interpretation is simply not tantamount to a
judicial power of textual amendment.”); Siegel, supra note 10, at 1405 (“The living have not
assented to Article V as the sole method of constitutional change. And if we are to construe
the living as having implicitly consented to any constitutional understanding or arrangement,
it is to the Constitution as it is currently interpreted, with its many pathways of change.”).
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Constitution can be, and indeed has been, amended outside of the
formal amendment process many times.26 Because originalists
reject in principle these unwritten amendments to the
Constitution, there would be great value in determining whether
the actual behavior of the people indicated consent to such an
unwritten amendment.
An objector to this framework might argue that the
description presented of originalism is over-simplistic. The
“originalism” described here is the “old originalism,” which has
been substantially altered by generations of scholars into a “new
originalism.”27 Some modern originalists have embraced the
notion that the Constitution as understood at the time of its
ratification (and subsequent amendments), does not intend to
answer all modern questions.28 In those areas, it is legitimate to
recognize space for construction in areas where “original meaning
will run out as a useful tool for judges needing to resolve the
case.”29 The existence of the recognition of this “construction
26. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1072-73 (1988) (“Unless We the People of the
1980s can amend our Constitution by a simple majority—a majority of the polity, mind you,
not of Congress (as I shall explain in more detail below, it is a gross mistake to equate
Congress with the People)—the Constitution loses its most defensible claim to derive from
the People.”) (footnote omitted); Professors Balkin and Levinson have located sources of
unwritten amendments in both partisan appointments to the federal judiciary, see Jack M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045, 1068 (2001) (“Partisan entrenchment through presidential appointments to the
judiciary is the best account of how the meaning of the Constitution changes over time
through Article III interpretation rather than through Article V amendment.”), and through
the actions of the political branches, administrative agencies, and even lobbying groups and
think tanks, see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 489, 498 (2006) (“[M]uch constitutional development (and therefore much
constitutional change) occurs outside of judicial case law.”) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson,
Constitutional Change].
27. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 8.
28. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The
Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1248 (2019) (“Second,
at least some constitutional provisions employ terms that are vague or open-textured; these
provisions do not provide bright-line rules.
Such provisions create a zone of
underdeterminacy that allows for doctrinal dynamism consistent with fixed meaning.”).
29. ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 92 (Cambridge University Press 2018).
Professor Segall notes that some modern originalists have found that the Supreme Court
decisions guaranteeing marriage equality are correct originalist interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 178. As Professor Segall observes, this is “despite the
unarguable fact that in each of those cases [referring not merely to Obergefell, but also Brown
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zone,” some might argue, makes my characterization of
originalism as preventing unwritten amendments nothing but a
strawman.
Nonetheless, this Article will persist in using a definition of
originalism that binds it to the original public meaning of the
Constitution or the intent of its drafters.30 There are two reasons
that I believe justify this decision. The first is that, whatever selfdescribed originalist scholars may say about their project, the
public face of the doctrine continues to be one that insists that it
operates as a real and effective constraint upon judges,31 and
offers the only real fealty to the written Constitution.32 When
prominent political leaders,33 public thinkers,34 and members of
the judiciary35 all purport to subscribe to originalism for these
principles, it seems fair to cabin discussion of originalism to the
proclaimed theory and take it seriously as it is used in the public
square.36
The second reason for not treating the various schools of
“New Originalism” is that they are simply too multifaceted to
v. Board of Education and Lawrence v. Texas] the justices explicitly denied that original
meaning generated the outcomes.” Id.
30. As will be seen, for the legal tender dispute, there is no difference between the two.
See id. at 92.
31. NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 112 (Crown Forum 2019)
(after claiming that originalists are constrained by a “value-neutral methodology” and a
“closed record of historical evidence,” the Justice warned “[a]llow me to reign over the
country as a living constitutionalist and you have no idea how I will exercise that fickle
power.”).
32. Id. at 25 (“Originalism is simply the idea that when interpreting the Constitution,
we should look to text and history and how the document was understood at the time of its
ratification”).
33. See, e.g., Sen. Ted Cruz, Speech to the Federalist Society National Lawyers
Convention (Nov. 18, 2016), [https://perma.cc/X8J8-6RVJ] (describing Justice Scalia as “a
passionate defender of the Constitution. Not the Constitution as it has been contorted and
revised by generations of activist jurists, but the Constitution as it was understood by the
people who ratified it and made it the law of the land”).
34. See, e.g., Ed Whelan, Brown and Originalism, NAT’L REV. (May 11, 2005),
[https://perma.cc/3XK9-E5LG] (calling the “living Constitution” an “Orwellian
euphemism” whose proponents “absurdly contend that the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment stating that no state shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law’ somehow should be twisted to guarantee rights to abortion and same-sex
marriage”).
35. GORSUCH, supra note 31, at 110 (“Originalists believe that the Constitution should
be read in our time the same way it was read when adopted.”).
36. Indeed, one might argue that old originalism continues to be the public meaning of
the term originalism. See id. at 110-11.

676

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73:4

constitute anything more than, as Professor Segall has put it, a
matter of faith.37 As the disputes about meaning among selfproclaimed new originalists show, those schools are now
“indistinguishable from Justice Brennan’s theory of the living
Constitution.”38
Constraining the meaning of originalism to the genuine
public meaning of the written document at the time of its adoption
allows for a direct test of originalism’s rejection of unwritten
amendments. If the theory of this Article is correct, the theory of
consent of the governed must allow the people today to tacitly
express their consent to a change that does not appear in the
Constitution as written and formally amended.39 A test occurs if
a clear, unwritten amendment to the Constitution has nearly
universal modern consent.40 If one were to discover a common
behavior of government that violated the original intent or the
original public meaning—or both—then the originalist project
should demand that we end it.41 Scholars have advocated a return
to constitutional precepts about which the widely popular view of
today is arguably wrong.42 Areas in question have ranged from
the serious43 to the satirical.44
37. SEGALL, supra note 29, at 178 (“There is no theory of originalism that leads to
agreement among scholars and judges about how the Supreme Court should decide cases.”)
38. Id. at 81.
39. See Griffin, supra note 8, at 1208.
40. Decades ago, Professor Akhil Reed Amar proposed that a source could be found
for unwritten amendments in the triangle of popular sovereignty provisions formed by the
Constitution’s Preamble and its Ninth and Tenth Amendments, see Amar, supra note 58, at
492.
41. See Griffin, supra note 8, at 1187.
42. Raoul Berger, Interstate Commerce: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 785, 786 (1996) (“[W]e must return to the Founders’ design. Our duty as scholars is
to ascertain what they intended, regardless of the Court’s divagations.”); Randy E. Barnett,
Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the Constitution in Exile, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 669,
669 (2006) (“What Restoring the Lost Constitution is really about is restoring various ‘lost
clauses’ that have gradually been removed from the Constitution by misinterpretation over a
very long period of time.”).
43. Examples include the scope of the Commerce Clause, see Berger, supra note 42,
at 786, and the twentieth century administrative state, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise
of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994).
44. See, e.g., Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously:
Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237,
253 (1995). For the purpose of this Article, it must be noted that the contest for which this
was an entry by Professors Steiker, Balkin, and Levinson featured, as its prize, paper money
as legal tender. Contest: Was George Washington Constitutional?, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
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A clear and easy example resides in the purse, the wallet, or
the pocket of most readers of this Article. For every bill of United
States currency, every bit of printed money issued by the
government contains the phrase “[t]his note is legal tender for all
debts public and private.”45 And that statement is, whether
viewed from the perspective of the original intention of the
Framers or the original public meaning of the Constitution,
unconstitutional.46
II. THE ISSUE OF PAPER AS LEGAL TENDER
Because modern use occasionally conflates some of the
terms important to this discussion, it is important to separate three
137, 138 (1995) (“First prize in each category is an attractive portrait of Washington himself,
printed on special green paper . . . .”).
45. Tamara Kurtzman, Cashing Out, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2019, at 22, 24.
46. Few originalist scholars have attempted to defend paper money as legal tender on
originalist grounds. But, c.f., Robert G. Natelson, Paper Money and the Original
Understanding of the Coinage Clause, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1017, 1079 (2008)
(basing this power on the express power of Congress to coin money because “the money thus
‘coined’ did not need to be metallic. Paper or any other material that Congress selected
would suffice”). Professor Natelson makes as compelling a case as can probably be made
that paper money as legal tender can be fitted within an originalist understanding of the
Constitution. To do so, though, he has to find it possible to “coin paper” in the placement of
a deleted phrase by John Rutledge, id. at 1057; find other references to “coin” that do not
refer to specie, which he acknowledges are ambiguous, id. at 1061-64; and cite to comments
of various key figures of the founding alluding to the legitimacy, if not the wisdom, of “paper
money,” id. at 1078-79. Ultimately, I reject Professor Natelson’s explanation for three
distinct reasons. First, even he concedes that the uses of “coin” for something other than
specie are uncommon and he notes that the history of colonial uses of material other than
precious metals as legal tender had not always gone well. See Natelson, supra note 46, at
1039 (“[T]he currencies in all four New England colonies performed as poorly as a pessimist
might expect.”). Second, his use of “paper money” in, for example, the correspondence of
Adams and Jefferson, id. at 1078, omits the distinction between paper money and legal
tender. Indeed, he refers to the emissions of paper money during the War of 1812 referenced
in Justice Field’s dissent in Knox v. Lee, id., at 1078 n.340, but those issuances were
specifically not designated as legal tender. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457,
637 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting) (“In all of them the issue of the notes was authorized as a
means of borrowing money . . . and in all of them the receipt of the notes by third parties was
purely voluntary.”). Finally, as noted repeatedly during the arguments and opinions of
Hepburn v. Griswold and Knox v. Lee, Congress had simply never attempted to use this
power before the mid-point of the Civil War. See Natelson, supra note 46, at 1019 n.3. It is
an odd originalist argument that the ratifiers of the Constitution intended for the federal
government to have a power, but the government of the day and those for decades after
simply ignored it despite critical needs during wars and financial catastrophes. See, infra,
notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
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ideas: legal tender, currency, and money. Legal tender is that
which is “approved in a country for the payment of debts, the
purchase of goods, and other exchanges for value.”47 Personal
checks, for example, are not legal tender; merchants can accept
them or not as they choose.48 No creditor, though, has the right
to reject an offer in satisfaction from a debtor provided that it is
made in legal tender; courts will recognize the debt as having been
paid.49 Currency, on the other hand, is anything “that circulates
as a medium of exchange.”50 Issued by banks, governments, or
even individuals, paper currency in earlier times was generally a
record of a transaction or promise.51 Third parties might well
choose to accept it or not, but that choice, as well as the value to
ascribe to the currency, was just as subject to negotiation as any
other term between parties.52 That would stop being true if, and
only if, a government would grant to some form of currency the
status of legal tender, as legal tender by definition always carries
the value set by the government.53 Money, as a technical matter,
is “[t]he medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a
government as part of its currency.”54 The term “money” was
generally, but not exclusively, used to refer to something having

47. Legal Tender, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
48. Genesee Scrap & Tin Baling Co. v. City of Rochester, 558 F. Supp. 2d 432, 436
(W.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[C]hecks are not legal tender in themselves, and cannot lawfully be made
such by state or municipality fiat. They may, however, be used as a substitute for legal
tender, because the payee ultimately has the right to present the check to a bank and redeem
it for cash in the form of United States currency.”).
49. Indeed, the modern rule protects tenders that are not legal tender unless the creditor
expresses a contemporary objection to the form of the payment. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF CONTRACTS § 305 (AM. LAW INST 1932) (“[T]ender is made of a valid check or of some
form of currency which is not legal tender for the purpose, and the tender is rejected without
a statement that a ground of objection is the medium of payment, the tender is not thereafter
open to that objection . . . .”).
50. Currency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
51. It must be noted that even those destined to lose the struggle over the legal tender
status of paper money agreed that the United States had the authority to issue a paper
currency. See, e.g., Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 582 (1871) (Chase, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[W]e do not question the authority to issue notes or to fit them for a circulating
medium, or to promote their circulation by providing for their receipt in payment of debts to
the government, and for redemption either in coin or in bonds; in short, to adapt them to use
as currency.”).
52. See id. at 582-83.
53. See id. at 583.
54. Money, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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the status of legal tender.55 Money could originally only be made
from precious metals.56 This use of coins, though, was
problematic.
Carrying large amounts of coin could be
cumbersome, and it left one potentially vulnerable to the
deprivations of the highwayman.57
The monetary experience of the colonies during the
Revolutionary War and as newly independent states operating in
the Confederation was not a good one.58 With a far greater need
for resources than their limited money in the form of coins would
support, colonies issued paper currency of their own, backed by a
promise to pay.59 The Continental Congress followed suit, and
large parts of the revolutionary effort were funded through what
were essentially debt obligations.60 These notes could be
circulated after their initial issue, but they functioned like any
other bonds in this status: creditors could choose to accept them
at less than face value.61 That they did so consistently and
dramatically accounts for the appearance and persistence of the
55. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 47. Because the use of the term varied
then and varies still, this Article will include the phrase “legal tender” where there might be
any doubt about the intended meaning.
56. Ali Khan, The Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 U.
CIN. L. REV. 393, 402 (1999) (“Long before the framing of the Constitution, precious metals
were used as money in and among markets of the world. Cheaper metals and raw materials
were used as money only when precious metals were unknown or scarce.”).
57. Id. at 411 (“Dealing in hard money was cumbersome and risky, especially in big
transactions that required a heavy amount of gold or silver to be transported to a distant place.
In such transactions, paper banknotes provided a safe and convenient substitute with a
considerably low transaction cost.”). Although the story is an invented one, the film Rob
Roy locates the source of that outlaw’s difficulties in a robbery that occurs after a subordinate
accepts payment on his behalf in coin rather than a bank note. ROB ROY (United Artists
Corporation 1995).
58. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 175 (Univ. Press of Kan. 1985) (describing Rhode Island’s
issue of “a large amount of unsecured paper currency” as a method of retiring its debt, a
scheme which helped it gain “the opprobrious sobriquet of Rogue’s Island”).
59. Rhode Island not only made its notes legal tender for all debts, but disenfranchised
those who would not accept the currency at face value. See id. at 176 (noting that a relatively
small number of debtors actually used the legal tender provision when their creditors opposed
it, but observing that this fact seemed seldom noticed in other states horrified by Rhode
Island’s actions).
60. Khan, supra note 56, at 398 (“As the supply of specie was inadequate to conduct
the war, Congress began to issue bills of credit[:] . . . a negotiable promissory note in a bearer
form so that it could freely circulate as a money-substitute.”).
61. See Timothy A. Canova, Lincoln’s Populist Sovereignty: Public Finance of, by,
and for the People, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 561, 578 (2009).
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phrase “not worth a Continental” to describe an item of
exceedingly small value.62
In the debates at the Constitutional Convention, as well as
the language during Reconstruction, it is vital to mind the
boundaries of these terms. The key issue for this Article is not
whether the federal government could issue currency; only a few
of the Framers sought to prevent that.63 Nor is the question
whether the federal government could accept paper currency in
satisfaction for debts it was owed, whether of its own issue or
not.64 The question for the Framers was whether the new general
government would have the power recently exercised by Rhode
Island:65 the power to make paper money not only a useful
currency but also a legal tender for private transactions.66 Their
answer was no.67
III. THE FRAMERS SPEAK: PAPER MAY NOT BE
LEGAL TENDER
If one’s guiding star for understanding the Constitution is the
intent of those who drafted it, there are few areas in which that
intent is as clear as in the question of paper money as legal tender.
One event demonstrates that intent more clearly than any other:
the debate over bills of credit. An early draft explicitly provided
Congress the power to “emit bills on the credit of the U. States”
in the power to borrow money.68 In the middle of August,
Gouverneur Morris rose to move the striking of these words,
which were designed to allow Congress to issue notes of
indebtedness that could circulate as currency.69 He warned that
otherwise the “Monied interest” would oppose the new

62. Id. (noting that “the general depreciation of the Continental currency” began a
spiral by causing the Continental Congress to have to issue even more paper currency).
63. See James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73, 74 (1887).
64. All creditors always have this power. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457, 638 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting).
65. MCDONALD, supra note 58, at 175.
66. See generally James Madison, Thursday. August 16. In Convention. (1787), in 4
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 219-21 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1903).
67. Id. at 219, 221-22.
68. Id. at 219.
69. Id.
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Constitution.70 Madison, hoping to protect the power to use
promissory notes, noted that it should suffice to guarantee that
such currency could not be made a legal tender.71 Oliver
Ellsworth responded forcefully that this was “a favorable moment
to shut and bar the door against paper money.”72 Other Framers
took their turns denouncing the evil. James Wilson noted that it
would be “a most salutary influence on the credit of the U. States
to remove the possibility of paper money.”73 Pierce Butler argued
that no European nation had the power to issue paper as legal
tender.74 Delaware lawyer George Read set the farthest boundary
for supporting Morris’s proposed amendment by claiming that
“the words, if not struck out, would be as alarming as the mark of
the Beast in Revelations.”75 Although the religious views of the
Framers varied, the fact that a respected elder would compare
paper money to apocalyptic evil suggested the fervor with which
the founding generation held this now-unfamiliar view. The
motion of Gouverneur Morris passed, and the words were struck
out.76
It must be noted that the removal of this language may not
have accomplished what Madison thought it did. Generations
later, Congress would declare that it did have the authority to
issue paper money as legal tender.77 In considering the effect of
the Morris amendment on this question, Professor Thayer would
argue that “the removal of an express grant of power . . . was not
a prohibition of the power,”78 and it is a powerful justification for
this view that the text agreed upon in 1787 does include a

70. Id.
71. Madison, supra note 66, at 219 (“[W]ill it not be sufficient to prohibit the making
them a tender? This will remove the temptation to emit them with unjust views. And
promissory notes in that shape may in some emergencies be best.”).
72. Id. at 220. He also noted that preventing Congress from having this power would
win “more friends of influence . . . than by almost any thing else. Paper money can in no
case be necessary. . . . The power may do harm, never good.” Id. at 220-21.
73. Id. at 221.
74. Id.
75. Madison, supra note 66, at 221.
76. Id. at 221-22.
77. See infra, Part VII.
78. Thayer, supra note 63, at 80.
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prohibition regarding a declaration of legal tender by the states.79
Justice William Strong would later raise this same idea.80 But
such a textualist approach81 cannot really be squared with an
ideology that gives primacy to the Framers’ Intent.82
If one rejects an intentionalist originalism in favor of one
based on the understanding of those who ratified the new
Constitution, the rule against paper money as legal tender is no
less clear. The other luminaries of the day were almost uniform
in their hostility to paper money. The always-essential George
Washington noted to Rhode Island that its problems stemmed
from using paper as legal tender and were thus utterly
foreseeable.83 Thomas Jefferson predicted that a reversal of
fortune in a place that issued paper money would cause disaster,
demonstrating that “paper is poverty, that it is only the ghost of
money, and not money itself.”84 Madison himself, although he
had originally been uneasy about removing the whole clause that
Morris objected to, had never been a friend to using paper money
as legal tender. Instead he characterized it as unjust, unnecessary,
and pernicious.85 Even Alexander Hamilton agreed with
Madison’s characterization that paper money was sinister,

79. Farley Grubb, The U.S. Constitution and Monetary Powers: An Analysis of the
1787 Constitutional Convention and How a Constitutional Transformation of the Nation’s
Monetary System Emerged 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 11783,
2005).
80. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 546 (1871).
81. Although they are “confused,” see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982), textualism and originalism are by no means the
same. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230 (1988)
(advocating a model that “calls for judges to apply the rules of the written constitution in the
sense in which those rules were understood by the people who enacted them”).
82. See Thayer, supra note 63, at 79 (noting that “the majority of the speakers thought
that they were prohibiting bills of credit and paper money. They were wrong”).
83. Letter from George Washington to Jabez Bowen (Jan. 9, 1787) in 4 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 504, 505 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1995)
(“Paper money has had the effect in your State that it ever will have, to ruin commerce—
oppress the honest, and open a door to every species of fraud and injustice.”).
84. Thomas Jefferson, To Edward Carrington (May 27, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 208, 209 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956).
85. James Madison, Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money (Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 158, 158-59 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal ed.,
1975).
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suggesting at least by 1783 that it was inherently “pregnant with
abuses.”86
Less famous members of American society agreed: paper
money was a horror. At least one writer of the day argued that
the Constitution did not go far enough.87 The Anti-Federalist who
called himself “Deliberator,” argued in 1788 that the Constitution
would in fact allow the federal government to spawn this horror:
Though I believe it is not generally so understood, yet
certain it is, that Congress may emit paper money, and even
make it a legal tender throughout the United States; and,
what is still worse, may, after it shall have depreciated in the
hands of the people, call it in by taxes, at any rate of
depreciation (compared with gold and silver) which they
may think proper. For though no state can emit bills of
credit, or pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts,
yet the Congress themselves are under no constitutional
restraints on these points.88

It must be noted, though, that Deliberator’s view of
congressional powers was—as is appropriate for an advocate—
extreme. In addition to claiming that the proposed Constitution
allowed the issuance of paper money, he envisioned a world in
which Congress might “if they shall think it for the ‘general
welfare,’ establish an uniformity in religion throughout the
United States.”89
If Deliberator’s understanding of the paper money power
was not idiosyncratic, one would expect it to a more common
objection among the Anti-Federalists. Yet other Anti-Federalists
do not seem to have pressed this particular attack.90 Far more
86. Alexander Hamilton, Continental Congress Unsubmitted Resolution Calling for a
Convention to Amend the Articles of Confederation (July 1783), in 3 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 420, 422 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962).
87. Deliberator, What Congress Can Do; What a State Can Not, in THE
ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 122 (Morten Borden ed., 1965)
88. Id. at 125.
89. Id. Even before the First Amendment’s religion clauses, it is difficult to square the
assertion of this power with the textual guarantee of religious freedom. U.S. CONST. art. VI
(“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust
under the United States.”).
90. Indeed, where opposition to the Constitution referred to paper money, it was often
among those few defenders of the practice of granting it legal tender status, who were
concerned with the explicit prohibition of this power of the states. See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER,
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 246 (Simon &
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common as an objection from the Anti-Federalists was that
directed to the explicit ban on the states granting legal tender
status to paper money.91 “Brutus” argued that the legal tender
prohibition combined with that on duties and imposts meant that
“the legislatures of the several states will find it impossible to
raise monies to support their governments.”92 Luther Martin
argued that paper money had previously offered “great benefit,”
and that “it is impossible to foresee that events may not take place
which shall render paper money of absolute necessity.”93
Even though Deliberator’s argument was an uncommon one,
Madison responded to it forcefully. In the Federalist Papers he
argued that the use of paper money as legal tender was more
easily avoided under the Constitution than without it.94 He
reminded the New Yorkers whose ratification votes he sought that
the Constitution prohibited the states from ever again using paper
as a legal tender, and reminded them what “pestilent effects” such
money had “on the industry and morals of the people, and on the
character of republican government.”95 As Deliberator might
well have noted, this passage was in a section specifically
discussing Article I, Section 10—only a limitation on state power
was at issue.96 Yet, it is difficult to believe that an advocate like
Madison would have used such inflammatory language regarding
paper money if large sections of the public held the view that the
Constitution gave Congress this very power, while denying it to
the states. It is a fair conclusion that the ratifying public
Schuster 2010) (“Some prominent leaders in the fight against unconditional ratification of
the Constitution had also fought for paper money in Maryland. Those affluent freeholders
were often also debtors, having borrowed money to buy confiscated Loyalist property.”).
91. See James Philbin, The Political Economy of the Antifederalists, J. LIBERTARIAN
STUD., 79, 88 (1994).
92. Brutus, “If You Adopt It . . . Posterity Will Execrate Your Memory”, N.Y. J., Oct.
18, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 164, 168 (Bernard Bailyn ed.,
1993).
93. Luther Martin, The Genuine Information VIII, MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 1788,
reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 645, 649 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). If
Martin believed that the federal government had been given this power to offset depriving
the states of it, he did not say so. See id. at 645-51.
94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(listing “[a] rage for paper money” as an example of the kind of “improper or wicked project”
less likely to infect the whole United States than any particular state).
95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 281 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
96. Id. at 280; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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understood the document the same way that its authors had—they
believed the Constitution took a position against paper money as
legal tender.97 This view was widespread and transcended other
disagreements; a delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying
convention lamented the decline in virtue and blamed paper
money and lawful piracy.98 Noah Webster’s defense of senates
as checks on unwise legislation regretted that the Rhode Island
senate had proven unable to stop the “rage for paper money,” but
noted that Maryland’s had, despite the fact that the rage was
“bordering on madness.”99 Promoters of the Constitution
frequently decried their opponents as “Paper-Money-men.”100
The conclusion of the times about the borrowing clause after
the Morris amendment seems to have been that ascribed to it by
Madison: it gave Congress the power to issue paper notes, but
neither that power nor the power to coin money allowed the
federal government to demand that this paper money be accepted
by private citizens as legal tender for debts.101 Unless huge
amounts of contrary evidence have slipped away from the
97. H.A. Scott Trask, Did the Framers Favor Hard Money?, MISES INST. (Sept. 15,
2003), [https://perma.cc/G2FR-QQZL].
98. Mr. Turner, A Sharp Exchange on the Powers of Congress and Its Probable
Corruption, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 896, 897
(Bernard Bailyn ed., Library of Am. 1993) (“[T]he operation of paper money, and the
practice of privateering, have produced a gradual decay of morals . . . .”).
99. NOAH WEBSTER, A CITIZEN OF AMERICA (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES,
AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 129, 132-33 (Bernard Bailyn
ed., Library of Am. 1993).
100. See, e.g., TIMOTHY PICKERING, REFUTATION OF THE “FEDERAL FARMER” (Dec.
24, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER
RATIFICATION 289, 295 (Bernard Bailyn ed., Library of Am. 1993) (noting that if there were
any opponents of the Constitution in New England, they would primarily be “Shayites &
Paper-Money-men: but their numbers & characters are alike contemptible”).
101. See Legal Tender Status, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Jan. 4, 2011),
[https://perma.cc/8293-LZZV]. Certainly not germane to the views of all originalists, but
nonetheless worth noting when considering the public meaning of the Constitution is the
large chronological leap this Article is about to take. This gap reflects the fact that there was
not a single act of Congress making paper money a legal tender between the ratification of
the Constitution and the Civil War. See E. G. SPAULDING, HISTORY OF THE LEGAL TENDER
PAPER MONEY ISSUED DURING THE REBELLION 5-6 (Buffalo, Express Printing Co. 1869).
The understanding of the ratifying generation seems to have held for the next several
generations as well. See Natelson, supra note 46, at 1019.
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historical record, it is difficult to make the argument that
Congress could grant legal tender status to the paper it printed.102
IV. THE JUSTICES SPEAK: PAPER MAY NOT BE
LEGAL TENDER
Mrs. Hepburn owed Mr. Griswold $12,720.103 She had
taken out a loan from him, and the principal plus interest
amounted to that sum in the spring of 1864.104 Haled into
Chancery Court in Louisville, Kentucky, Mrs. Hepburn offered
the full sum in the form of paper money—”greenbacks”105—
printed by the United States government.106 Mr. Griswold
refused, as the loan had been made in coin, he demanded coin in
return.107 Mrs. Hepburn then paid the court in paper money, the
court accepted the offer pursuant to an 1862 Act of Congress, and
the court dismissed Griswold’s lawsuit.108 His appeal was
granted by a Kentucky court and Mrs. Hepburn then elevated the
case to the United States Supreme Court.109
Many events conspired to make the case of more interest
than the sum of money would suggest. The notion that paper
could be accepted in payment of debts was not new; indeed, for
hundreds of years some people had preferred paper to coin.110 But
in 1862, Congress took a step beyond the conventional thinking
that the Constitution barred it from making true paper money.111
While authorizing a large issue of paper currency, Congress made
the greenbacks legal tender for all debts, public and private.112
102. Trask, supra note 97.
103. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 605 (1870).
104. Id.
105. So called because of the green-colored ink with which they were printed. See G.
Edward White, Reconstructing the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Salmon P. Chase, 21 N.
KY. L. REV. 41, 67 (1993).
106. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 605.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Court initially heard argument in the 1867 term, but reheard it the
following year to allow the United States Attorney General to be heard on this matter of
“great public importance.” Id. at 605-06.
110. See White, supra note 105, at 64.
111. Legal Tender Act, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345, 345 (1862).
112. After setting forth the authorization to the Treasury to issue non-interest bearing
notes and to accept them in payment of taxes and duties owed to the United States, the law
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The Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, was ambivalent
about the legal tender provision, but desperately needed the
authorization for these new notes.113 When he received that
authorization, he set to work using it to fund the war effort critical
to the survival of the nation.114 The Treasury Department even
put the face of its Secretary on some of the notes.115
By 1869, when Mrs. Hepburn’s suit reached the highest
court in the land, Salmon P. Chase had become the Chief
Justice.116 An observer might guess that he would lead the Court
into a decision upholding the authority of Congress to make legal
tender, even for preexisting debts, of the paper currency for which
he had been responsible and which was now quite popular.117
That observer would be wrong.118
A Court intent on limiting the powers of Congress might
have adopted a harsh and text-limited view of the Article I
powers.119 After all, not one word of Section 8 granted Congress
the right to set legal tender for the country.120 Such an opinion,
added that the notes “shall also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts,
public and private, within the United States.” Legal Tender Act, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345, 345.
113. See Randy E. Barnett, From Antislavery Lawyer to Chief Justice: The Remarkable
but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 653, 674 (2013).
114. Roger D. Billings, Jr., Book Review, 29 AKRON L. REV. 469, 469 (1996)
(reviewing JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE, A BIOGRAPHY (1995)) (“Chase kept Lincoln’s
government afloat with greenbacks.”).
115. DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 510 (Simon & Schuster 2005) (Chief Justice Chase “was also pleased
by the fact that his own handsome face would appear in the left-hand corner of every dollar
bill”).
116. President Lincoln had considerable doubts about Chase’s ambition but put them
aside to nominate his Treasury Secretary to be the new Chief Justice after Roger Taney’s
death. See id. at 679-80 (citing Lincoln’s response to Chief Justice Chase’s opponents that
he knew of Chase’s schemes but “I should despise myself if I allowed personal differences
to affect my judgment of his fitness for the office”).
117. Indeed, a post-war economic boom had significantly decreased the opposition to
paper money that had been present only a few years earlier. See IRWIN UNGER, THE
GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FINANCE, 1865-1879,
at 165 (1964) (opponents of paper money “who would later regain their hard money fervor
were to be strangely blind to the failings of paper money during the bonanza years”).
118. Id. at 174.
119. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 628 (1870) (Miller, J. dissenting)
(“[T]here have been from time to time attempts to limit the powers granted by [the
Constitution], by a narrow and literal rule of construction . . . .”); see also United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (narrowing the Court’s interpretation the Commerce Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to limit Congress’s power to regulate firearms).
120. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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to those who opposed it, would resemble the bizarre formalism of
the territorial governance portion of Chief Justice Taney’s
opinion in Scott v. Sandford.121 It would have been sufficiently
removed from the reality of mid-nineteenth century governance
that critics could simply brush it aside later.122
Chief Justice Chase did no such thing. Rather than reject a
limited view of Congressional power, he deliberately sought out
the most famously expansive version of those powers, the one set
forth by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.123 In
defending the constitutionality of Congress chartering a national
bank, the unanimous McCulloch Court had created a test that,
while paying lip service to the notion that Congress had limited
powers,124 nonetheless preserved a broad sense of federal
supremacy.125 John Marshall had established a test that required
only that the Constitution furnish a goal; Congress itself could
choose any measure of seeking to attain that goal, provided only
that it was a reasonable way of reaching toward it and it was not
specifically prohibited.126 This test, still relied on in the vast
majority of tests of congressional power, is apparently broad
enough to allow Congress to continue to incarcerate people after
the completion of their judicially imposed sentences.127 One
Justice in recent years went out of his way to characterize the
McCulloch test as “permissive.”128

121. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 436 (1857).
122. See United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 790-91 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No.
16,151).
123. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 614 (describing the test set forth in the permissive
McCulloch case as one that “has ever since been accepted as a correct exposition of the
Constitution”).
124. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (recognizing that the
federal “government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers”).
125. Id. (“[T]he government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme
within its sphere of action.”).
126. Id. at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”).
127. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129-30 (2010).
128. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[P]rincipally for reasons of stare decisis, I shall henceforth apply the permissive
McCulloch standard to congressional measures designed to remedy racial discrimination by
the States.”).

2021

UNWRITTEN AMENDMENTS

689

But even such a permissive test, in the hands of Chief Justice
Chase, sufficed to prevent Congress from making paper currency
a legal tender for private debts.129 Chase reminded his listeners
of the McCulloch test, noted also that the Necessary and Proper
Clause lacked a requirement that the act of Congress be
“absolutely necessary”, and added that money required a standard
of value that could only be set by governments.130 He
acknowledged that the Constitution expressly vested that very
standard-setting power in the legislature.131
The Court then found, though, that no enumerated power
offered a sufficiently clear goal to allow the same power to exist
regarding paper as legal tender.132 Using logic, the opinion
quickly ruled out the power to coin money,133 the war power, the
power to regulate commerce, or the power to borrow funds.134 To
find a power to make legal tender out of paper from one of these
sources, the Court held, would “convert the government, which
the people ordained as a government of limited powers, into a
government of unlimited powers.”135
Even though the first third of the McCulloch test was thus
found to have been failed, the Court proceeded to find that making
paper into legal tender was not a reasonable means in any
event.136 The Court had earlier noted a “well-known law of
currency” guaranteeing that paper would never be at face value
unless it was convertible into specie “promptly . . . at the will of
the holder” of the paper.137 It argued that adding the legal tender
requirement did nothing to improve the success of the notes.138 It
held that any benefit that might accrue from compelling the
acceptance of paper would be more than offset by “the
derangement of business,” inflation, and an accompanying “long
129. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1870) (concluding that the legal
tender acts failed the McCulloch test in multiple ways).
130. Id. at 615.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 616.
133. Id. (“It is certainly not the same power as the power to coin money.”).
134. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 617.
135. Id. at 618.
136. Id. at 622.
137. Id. at 608. Thus, the Court concluded that only coined specie had real value, and
that paper currency could never be more than a mere placeholder for it.
138. Id. at 620 (citing for this proposition “eminent writers”).
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train of evils.”139 Such a means was not “appropriate and plainly
adapted” to the Constitution’s purposes.140
Finally, the Court turned to the observation of Chief Justice
Marshall that the means chosen by Congress “must be not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution.”141 To find the spirit of the Constitution, Chief
Justice Chase looked, in the style of an originalist, to the words
and behavior of the framing generation.142 Anticipating the
discussion still ongoing between the original intent and public
meaning schools, he based his findings on the intent of both
“those who framed and those who adopted the Constitution.”143
He discovered their opposition to the use of paper as money in the
prohibition of the impairment of contracts,144 the requirement that
private property not be taken without just compensation,145 and
the due process protection of property.146 It is difficult not to
smile a little at Salmon P. Chase’s proffered self-defense over the
fact that a former Treasury Secretary who oversaw this very
change was authoring the very opinion announcing that the
change had been unconstitutional.147 It is much more difficult,
though, to argue that he was wrong as a matter of either textual
logic or the original intent (or public meaning) of the
Constitution.148
Not everyone agreed with the outcome of the case: Justice
Miller was joined by two other Justices in dissenting.149 Yet their
dissent does not demonstrate that the Chief Justice was wrong
about the text or the original meaning of the Constitution.150 On

139. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 621.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 622.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 623.
144. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 623.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 624.
147. Id. at 625 (“[A]mid the tumult of the late civil war . . . different views, never
before entertained . . . were adopted by many. . . . If power was assumed from patriotic
motives, the assumption found ready justification in patriotic hearts . . . .”).
148. Id. at 625-26.
149. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 626 (Miller, J., dissenting). Justices Swayne and
Davis, both appointed by President Lincoln, joined the dissent. Id.
150. See id. at 626-39.
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the contrary, they simply showed less concern for the text of the
Constitution than the majority had, and none whatsoever for the
original meaning of that document.151
As to the former, the best argument Justice Miller could
summon was that the Constitution prohibited the states from
making anything but gold or silver a lawful tender, but had no
such prohibition upon Congress.152 Indeed, this fact, especially
in conjunction with Congress’s power to coin money, might be an
arguable textual source for the paper money power, but not even
Justice Miller could find that power located there.153
Ultimately Justice Miller relied on the war power.154 He
found that the Civil War’s unparalleled destruction brought with
it the necessity for Congress “to devise some new means of
borrowing money on the credit of the nation.”155 This openly
non-originalist argument focused on the risk of a shortage of
capital that might have brought on the loss of the Civil War, the
division of the country, and the impoverishment of the people.156
Justice Miller expressed his certainty “[t]hat the legal tender act
prevented these disastrous results.”157 Without the legal tender
requirement, he maintained, the notes of the United States would
have sunk “to the dead level of worthless paper.”158 In short, the
necessity of the war allowed for the appearance of a wholly new
power.159
That this was an extraordinarily non-originalist approach
appeared as a concession when Justice Miller spoke about the
governing officials who had ultimately passed the 1862 and 1863
Acts. He observed about them that they “had been trained in a
school which looked upon such legislation with something more
than distrust.”160 Indeed, that American society had continued the
founding generation’s view of the evils of paper as money is
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id.
Id. at 627.
Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 627. But, c.f., Natelson, supra note 46, at 1079.
Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 632.
Id.
Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634.
Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 633-34.
Id. at 634.
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evident in nearly every line of both the majority and the dissent.
Chief Justice Chase’s opinion carried with it the regret that better
judgment was not exercised by those with “patriotic hearts.”161
Justice Miller in response embraced the idea of paper as legal
tender as one that had been received during the Civil War “with
almost universal acquiescence.”162 In other words, for him it
simply did not matter what the founding generation thought—the
fact was that the dissenters agreed with the government and the
people of their own time who found the law to be “a necessity in
the most stringent sense in which that word can be used.”163
But the dissenters were outvoted.164 The Court had spoken.
The Congress of the United States was without authority to make
paper currency into a legal tender for all debts, public and
private.165
V. THE PEOPLE SPEAK: PAPER MAY BE LEGAL
TENDER
The assassination of Abraham Lincoln shook the body
politic of the United States.166 The efforts of his successor to
prevent meaningful societal change in the newly readmitted
former confederacy led to his impeachment, which was another
unprecedented moment for the nation.167 The campaigns of
revanchist violence that savaged the African-American
population of those states tore at the fabric of the country as

161. Id. at 625 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 638 (Miller, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 635.
164. Some controversy remains whether the decision should be thought of as 5-3 or 43. As Chief Justice Chase noted in his opinion, Justice Grier voted with the majority, but
retired from the Supreme Court before the decision was ultimately announced. Hepburn, 75
U.S.(8 Wall.) at 626 (majority opinion); see, infra, notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
165. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 626.
166. JAY WINIK, APRIL 1865: THE MONTH THAT SAVED AMERICA 259 (2001) (calling
the events surrounding the assassination “a time when the institutions of American
democracy faced perhaps their greatest test”).
167. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 18631877, at 333 (1988) (“[T]o the many dramatic innovations Reconstruction brought to
American politics, the spring of 1868 added yet another: the unprecedented spectacle of the
President’s trial before the Senate for ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’”).
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well.168 All of these events were widely fretted over at the time.169
Compared to them, the battle over paper money as legal tender
was small. Yet it too upset the natural political order, and it too
led to significant changes in the United States.170
The long-term advocates of paper money never treated
Hepburn v. Griswold as the last word on the subject.171 Indeed,
it could not be. Although the opinion was technically limited to
the repayment of debts contracted before the Legal Tender Act,
not one word of Chief Justice Chase’s opinion regarding the
power of Congress made an analysis of debts contracted after the
Act any different.172 After all, the Court had invoked the
“permissive” language of McCulloch in finding that paper money
was beyond the power of Congress.173 If the federal government
lacked the power to make paper money legal tender, the
awareness of the parties that the government claimed this power
should make no logical difference. There might be more
sympathy for the creditor whose expectations of specie repayment
were dashed than one who knew beforehand that greenbacks
would repay any debt. Sympathy for the wronged, though, cannot
be the basis for congressional power—at least not if the idea of
congressional power is that it has any limits at all. Opposition to
the decision seemed to understand that it could not be cabined to
pre-1862 debts.174

168. Id. at 425 (“[T]he wave of counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts
of the South between 1868 and 1871 lacks a counterpart either in the American experience
or in that of other Western Hemisphere societies.”).
169. See UNGER, supra note 117, at 163.
170. The magnitude of Hepburn upsetting of the political order was not immediately
apparent, possibly because the holding explicitly concerned only legal tender for debts that
predated the 1862 act. See id.117 at 176 (noting that because of this limitation “[o]nly longterm obligations of states, municipalities, and—among business firms—railroad
corporations, together totaling some $350 million, were involved”).
171. See 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 691 (1971) (“Greenbackers became
a force in politics.”).
172. See id. at 705.
173. See, supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text; id. at 703-04.
174. Sidney Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, 50 POL. SCI.
Q. 343, 346 (1935) (noting “[a] powerful movement in Congress and among the masses”
against the decision).
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In the words of the Boston Daily Advertiser, “there is little
disposition to accept [the Hepburn decision] as final.”175 Because
of a fluke of timing, opposers would not have to. Efforts to
prevent President Andrew Johnson from replacing Justices had
reduced the Court to eight, and it was on its way to seven.176
Almost a year before the Hepburn decision, Republicans had
become convinced that the election of Ulysses Grant had defeated
Johnson’s program for the nation just as thoroughly as the
victories of Ulysses Grant had defeated Lee’s program for
secession on the battlefield.177 To increase Grant’s ability to
affect the Court, they passed an act in April 1869 that affected the
size of the Court in two ways. On the one hand, it restored the
size of the Court to nine; at the same time, it provided an incentive
for new vacancies to appear through judicial retirement, as any
Justice over seventy years of age who had already served for at
least ten years would receive his salary for life if he retired any
time after that December.178 When Justice Grier retired, as
Congress had no doubt hoped, President Grant suddenly had the
opportunity to remake the Court with two appointments.179
Scholarly opinions have varied over the generations about
the extent to which the change in personnel of the Court was
deliberately related to the Hepburn decision. Defenders of the
President, most notably former Attorney General Hoar, argued
that the selections were made before the decision came out; they
were delivered to the Senate the day of the decision, but the
selections of William Strong and Joseph Bradley preceded the
knowledge that the Court would rule against the constitutionality

175. FAIRMAN, supra note 171, at 767.
176. See David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 432
(2008) (“Congress had provided that until deaths or resignations reduced the number of
Supreme Court Justices from nine to seven, no vacancies on that tribunal should be filled.”).
177. Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for
a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 123 (2017) (“One of the first laws signed by President
Grant in 1869 expanded the Supreme Court back to nine Justices . . . .”).
178. FAIRMAN, supra note 171, at 716-17 (noting that the other Justices of the Court
gave Justice Grier their “unanimous view” that he should retire, which he agreed to do with
an effective date of the end of January 1870).
179. It might have been three, as Justice Samuel Nelson, like Justice Robert Grier, met
the statutory requirements for the full-pay retirement. Id. at 716. Nelson did not retire until
1872. Id. at 657.
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of paper money.180 Unfortunately for the Hoar defense, the
memoir of Treasury Secretary George Boutwell revealed that the
Chief Justice warned him of the Hepburn decision before its
release; as a former Secretary of the Treasury, Chase was
concerned about the possibility that the decision would cause a
run on gold.181 Scholars have long noted that the view of the
question taken by the two nominees was likely known to the
president—Justice Strong had even ruled in favor of paper as
legal tender when he was a justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.182 This Grant never denied; he would say only that he did
not “exact anything like a pledge or expression of opinion from
the parties he might appoint to the Bench.”183 Ultimately,
Professor Fairman’s view seems sound: even if President Grant
had as a key criterion for selecting Justices a confidence that they
would overturn Hepburn, use of such criteria was not
inappropriate.184
But the confidence that Hepburn was not a final settlement
was not merely based on the make-up of the Court. In embracing
the call for a rehearing, the Boston Daily Advertiser focused on
the practical impact of the decision, which was “much greater
than its defenders admit.”185 Writing of the decision as if it were
the sort of executive action that might be readily reversed, the
Advertiser warned of a great evil “if the decision is
maintained.”186 Actions by a diverse and widespread group of
interests showed that they continued to view paper money as legal
tender, the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
notwithstanding; some state government authorities announced

180. Ratner, supra note 174, at 349.
181. Id. at 352.
182. Id.; Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Pa. 9, 56-71 (1866) (Strong, J., dissenting).
183. Ratner, supra note 174, at 351.
184. See Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley’s Appointment to the Supreme Court
and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1133 (1941) (noting that if President
Grant knew about the outcome of Hepburn in advance he doubtlessly “regarded the decision
as profoundly wrong, and nominated judges whose opinions, according to the best
information available, he approved. Would anyone in his place have done otherwise?”).
185. FAIRMAN, supra note 171, at 767.
186. Id. at 767-78.
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that they would continue to accept paper money187 and some
private corporations, especially railroad interests, announced that
they would pay their debts in paper money.188
The decision’s opponents would prove to be correct; in just
over a year, the Court would again involve itself in the
controversy. The additions of Justices Bradley and Strong proved
vital to the reconsideration of the constitutional issue. Harper’s
Weekly, which supported paper money as legal tender, noted that
the new decision, Knox v. Lee, was not a normal constitutional
decision: “except for certain political hopes and expectations that
opinion would probably not have been rendered.”189
VI. THE JUSTICES SPEAK AGAIN: PAPER MAY
BE LEGAL TENDER
Only one year after the critical decision in Hepburn v.
Griswold, a supplicant asked the Supreme Court to consider the
legal matter again.190 This time, the occasion was the sale of a
herd of sheep owned by a Pennsylvanian named Mrs. Lee that
found itself in Texas upon the outbreak of hostilities.191 The
Confederacy seized and sold the sheep to a Mr. Knox.192 After
the war, Mrs. Lee’s lawsuit against the buyer for conversion took
a constitutional turn when she sought to introduce evidence that
the greenbacks in use at the time were less valuable than the gold
and silver specie with which the sheep had originally been
valued.193 The trial court declined to admit such evidence, but
reminded the jury at the end that their decision regarding the
amount of the damages could take into consideration that Mr.
187. Id. at 768-69 (citing a Maine resolution and a decision by a Pennsylvania State
Fund, although the latter was overturned by a state statute requiring the state treasurer to
comply with the Supreme Court decision).
188. Id. at 769-70 (offering examples of resolutions to use paper money but pay the
difference between them and their gold value in one case “if the present decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States is not reversed within a year”).
189. Id. at 766 (adding somewhat sadly that the Supreme Court was “not free from the
soliciting whispers of political ambition”).
190. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
191. Id. at 457. In the Legal Tender Cases, Knox v. Lee was paired with Parker v.
Davis, a case from Massachusetts involving a sale of land. Id. at 461-62.
192. Id. at 457.
193. Id. at 458.
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Knox could pay any judgment “in legal tender notes of the United
States.”194 Mr. Knox complained that this instruction increased
the amount of damages, and took the case to the Supreme
Court.195
The Court he faced consisted of nine Justices, including
seven that decided the Hepburn case.196 These seven Justices
split precisely along the lines they had the previous term.197 The
four remaining members of the Hepburn majority held to their
view that the Constitution did not allow for the making of paper
money into a legal tender.198 They were now a dissenting
minority, though, as the three dissenters from the previous battle
were joined by the two newly appointed Justices in finding that
the Constitution imposed no barrier at all to such legislation.199
The claims and counterclaims of the opinions—two for the
majority and three for the dissent—speak loudly about the
theories of constitutional governance offered by both sides.200
For in overturning a one-year old case, the Court did not use some
of the classic approaches for such changes of direction: the
application of the law was misguided,201 we know more now than
we did then,202 or we are not actually changing anything.203 This
time, the court simply came to a different conclusion based on a
194. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 458.
195. Id. at 459.
196. See id. at 603-04 & n.158 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
197. Compare id. at 529, 554 with Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 606,
626 (1870).
198. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529; Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at
606.
199. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529, 554; Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) at 626 (Miller, J., dissenting); Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to
Congressional Power: Revisiting the Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 144-45 (2006).
200. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529, 554, 570, 587, 604, 634.
201. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943) (Black
& Douglas, JJ., concurring) (explaining their change in vote from the previous Gobitis case
because “[l]ong reflection convinced us that although the principle is sound, its application
in the particular case was wrong”).
202. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (considering the
previously rejected claim that segregation did not cause feelings of inferiority but noting that
“[w]hatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority”).
203. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873
(1992) (rejecting the trimester framework while simultaneously reaffirming the “central
holding” of Roe v. Wade).
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different vote. Indeed, the majority went to some lengths to
suggest that overturning a case was not a particularly unusual
event.204 That is especially so, the majority noted, when the court
deciding the previous opinion was smaller than some thought it
ought to have been.205
Newly appointed Justice Strong delivered the majority
opinion.206 His pronouncement was an overtly prudentialist
one.207 Moments into his opinion he observed that a decision
striking down the legal tender status of paper money would lead
to “great business derangement, widespread distress, and the
rankest injustice.”208 Such a statement might have been
hyperbolic, but it would at least have been legitimate as the
observation of a Court that was considering a new issue and
writing on a blank slate. But the Knox Court had no such blank
slate: the same Court in the same chambers had struck down just
such a law only a year before.209 To warn of the consequences of
an unprecedented decision is one thing; to warn of the
consequences of merely reaffirming a recent precedent makes
considerably less sense. This is especially true when those
consequences are external to the actual record in the case.210
Having signaled the Court’s approval of paper as legal
tender, Justice Strong then proceeded to explain how the Court
considered the matter.211 Unsurprisingly, the majority relied on

204. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 554 (“[I]t is no unprecedented thing in
courts of last resort, both in this country and in England, to overrule decisions previously
made.”).
205. Id. at 553-54.
206. Id. at 529.
207. See BOBBITT, supra note 81, at 61 (“Prudential argument is constitutional
argument which is actuated by the political and economic circumstances surrounding the
decision.”).
208. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529.
209. Id. at 553; Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1870).
210. Modern discussions of the dangers of overturning precedent have generally
included reliance interests. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009)
(“Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of
stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of
course whether the decision was well reasoned.”). Whatever the new majority thought of
the reasoning of the decision, it is surprising to see a reversal of a precedent couched in a
claim for stability. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529.
211. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 547.
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McCulloch, just as all the Justices had in the previous term.212 But
if Justice Strong used a similar approach to that of Justice Miller
in Hepburn, it was different in a particularly significant way. For
Justice Miller, the legitimate ends provided by the Constitution
for the first prong of McCulloch had arisen from the war power.213
For Justice Strong, in what may have been a bit of foreshadowing,
no such reliance on the single war power was necessary.214
Instead, Justice Strong found that the ends provided by the
Constitution need not come from any single enumerated power;
indeed, the goal in question might “be deduced fairly from more
than one” enumerated power, or even “from them all
combined.”215 In language somewhat prescient of that which
Justice Douglas would later use to locate the source of the right
to privacy,216 Justice Strong concluded that a court might “group
together any number of them and infer from them all that the
power claimed has been conferred.”217
Moving to the second part of the test, the Court denied that
the relationship of Congress’s means to the constitutional end
need be “direct and immediate.”218
To determine that
relationship, in this case, he again turned to its consequences.219
If the legal tender laws had demonstrated their efficacy by saving
the nation, how could they be called unreasonable?220
The final step, that of showing that the laws did not conflict
with the Constitution’s letter or spirit, proved no more a barrier
for the Court than the first two steps.221 As to the letter, Justice
Strong used logic to demonstrate that the power to coin money
did not limit the ability to issue paper notes and declare them legal
212. This was a feature of all the legal tender cases. See Magliocca, supra note 199,
at 124 (“Despite their differences in result, all three cases relied on McCulloch and each
claimed that it was the best reading of Marshall’s work.”).
213. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 631-32 (Miller, J., dissenting).
214. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 534.
215. Id.
216. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (“The present case, then,
concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees.”).
217. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 534.
218. Id. at 543.
219. See id. at 541-43.
220. Id. at 541.
221. See id. at 544-53.
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tender.222 After all, Congress was only empowered to punish a
small group of crimes in the Constitution, yet it criminalized
much other behavior, often with McCulloch as its guide.223
Justice Strong did the same by reversing the previous majority’s
assumption regarding the prohibition of states from making paper
a legal tender: “when one of such powers was expressly denied to
the States only, it was for the purpose of rendering the Federal
power more complete and exclusive.”224
The spirit of the Constitution he identified with the
prohibition of the impairment of contracts.225 Yet this too the
Court rejected as the source for a possible limitation on
Congress.226 Expanding beyond the limited exception of the
Bankruptcy Clause, Justice Strong concluded that state law
governed contracts for the delivery of goods, but that federal law
was supreme in the area of contracts for money payments.227 He
used the fluctuation in the weight of gold coins of the United
States to illustrate that this power resided in Congress.228
It is worth pausing a moment to consider the meaning of the
Strong McCulloch test for federal power.229 The opinion pays
even less homage than McCulloch itself to the notion that the
federal government is one of limited and defined powers; instead,
it substitutes a strong sense of deference to a co-ordinate federal
branch.230 In determining whether Congress had exceeded its
limits, the Court now held that: (1) the Constitution provides the
goals of the federal government, but those goals may be inferred
from any collection of powers available to national
222. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 544-45.
223. See id. at 536-37.
224. Id. at 546.
225. Id. at 547.
226. Id. at 548.
227. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 549.
228. Id. at 551-52.
229. Professor Magliocca has persuasively argued that it is best thought of as a new
standard. See Magliocca, supra note 199, at 122 (“While Chief Justice Marshall’s landmark
decision is credited with creating the framework that governs the scope of federal power, the
operative standard really comes from the Legal Tender Cases decided following the Civil
War.”).
230. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 531 (“[T]he judiciary should presume,
until the contrary is clearly shown, that there has been no transgression of power by
Congress—all the members of which act under the obligation of an oath of fidelity to the
Constitution.”).
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governments;231 (2) the means chosen by Congress must be
reasonable, but might only be indirect moves toward those
penumbral goals;232 and (3) a constitutional prohibition would
limit Congress, but the Constitution would have to explicitly spell
it out for it to be effective.233 In short, the Court altered each of
the three parts of the McCulloch test; under this new version, it is
difficult to imagine that any power claimed by a majority of the
members of Congress may be found unconstitutional.234
Almost completely absent from Justice Strong’s opinion is
any role for the Founding Fathers or the generation that ratified
the Constitution. Indeed, his only real observation about those
people is the rather startling conclusion that they must have been
aware that “emergencies might arise when the precious metals
(then more scarce than now) might prove inadequate to the
necessities of the government and the demands of the people.”235
In other words, the founding generation must have realized that
sometimes the nation would run short of specie and would simply
have to print notes and declare them to be legal tender for all
debts, public and private. Why that generation did not create a
slightly less opaque way of providing for this crisis that they saw
looming is a mystery that Justice Strong chose not to solve for us.
Justice Bradley’s concurrence offered a slightly more
limited, but no more originalist, perspective on the problem.236
For although Justice Bradley seemed to take a sweeping, organic
view of federal power similar to that later espoused by Justice
Holmes,237 he did attempt to cabin the majority decision
231. Id. at 534.
232. See id. at 536 (“[T]he whole history of the government and of congressional
legislation has exhibited the use of a very wide discretion . . . in the selection of the necessary
and proper means to carry into effect the great objects for which the government was framed
. . . .”).
233. Id. at 531 (noting that to find a law in violation of the Constitution, proponents
must show a clear violation and not merely raise a doubt).
234. This was not lost on the dissenters, who lamented the loss of limited government.
See id. at 633 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (insisting that for the Court to ignore the meaning of
the limited powers delegated to Congress was “to establish a new Constitution or to do for
the people what they have not chosen to do for themselves”).
235. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 546 (Bradley, J., concurring).
236. See id. at 554-70.
237. Compare id. at 555 (“The United States is not only a government, but it is a
National government . . . . It has jurisdiction over all those general subjects . . . which affect
the interests of the whole people equally . . . .”), with Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433
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somewhat by grounding it in the emergency conditions of the
day.238 Without ever varying significantly from the majority’s
analysis, he asserted that the context of that analysis was an
existential threat to the United States.239 Giving paper money
legal tender status was merely incidental to its printing, he noted
reassuringly.240 It was certainly not a radical act, “like the coinage
of leather or ivory or kowrie shells.”241 It was merely a traditional
note—a pledge that could be redeemed in specie at some future
date.242 “No one supposes,” he predicted (inaccurately), “that
these government certificates are never to be paid—that the day
of specie payments is never to return.”243
For Justice Bradley, this issuance of what seemed to be
merely promissory notes—and certainly not an attempt to “make
dollars” out of paper—had proven vital to the survival of the
Republic.244 This power was only small, and nonthreatening, but
nonetheless would not “be resorted to except upon extraordinary
and pressing occasions, such as war.”245 He seemed confident in
his prediction that things would soon return to normal. They
would not.
Unlike Justice Strong, Justice Bradley did exhibit some
concern for the experiences of the generation that framed the
Constitution. He noted the experiments during the Revolutionary
War, and paused to share Benjamin Franklin’s observation that
the depreciation of paper money would reduce the public debt by
(1920) (quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)) (“[I]t is not lightly to be
assumed that, in matters requiring national action, ‘a power which must belong to and
somewhere reside in every civilized government’ is not to be found. “).
238. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 567 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“[T]he
power to make treasury notes a legal tender . . . is nevertheless a power not to be resorted to
except upon extraordinary and pressing occasions.”).
239. Justice Bradley did deny that this was limited to wartime, though. Id. (refusing
to limit the source of legal tender authority to the war power as “other public exigencies may
arise in the history of a nation which may make it expedient and imperative to exercise it”).
240. Id. at 560.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 561. Of course, the day of specie
payments has never returned. See generally Jacob Goldstein & David Kestenbaum, Why We
Left the Gold Standard, NPR: PLANET MONEY (Apr. 21, 2011), [https://perma.cc/57W5ZC44].
244. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 561 (Bradley, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 567.
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the very act of depreciating.246 Remarkably, his survey of the preconstitutional experiences of paper money led him to conclude
that the decision to make paper a legal tender was “always a
question for the legislative discretion.”247
After this
astonishing—and unconvincing—review of the founding
generation, he returned to his present, prudentialist framework.
Here he concluded that the broad power at issue was necessary to
prevent the “heart of the nation” from being “crushed out.”248
The four dissenters could not have agreed less with this
proposition.
Between them, they offered three distinct
dissents.249 All cover much of the same ground, but they share
the sentiment expressed by the Chief Justice that the new result
was merely the product of having new Justices on the Court.250
The remaining members of the previous year’s majority, who now
“find themselves in a minority on the court,” were utterly
unpersuaded by the decision.251 Chief Justice Chase then walked
again the ground he had trod in Hepburn, applying McCulloch
and finding the law wanting.252 Indeed, he assured the country
“[r]eflection has only wrought a firmer belief in the soundness of
the constitutional doctrines maintained, and in the importance of
them to the country.”253
Chief Justice Chase rejected “wholly” Justice Strong’s
aggregate powers argument.254 Not only was this idea, that
constitutional grants of authority emanated powers beyond their
words, “advanced for the first time” in this case, but the
acceptance of such a doctrine, the Chief Justice claimed, would
alter the entire system.255 That idea, plus the idea that Congress

246. Id. at 557.
247. Id. at 558.
248. Id. at 564.
249. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 570, 587, 634 (Chase, C.J., Clifford &
Field, JJ., dissenting).
250. Id. at 572, 634 (Chase, C.J. & Field J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 572 (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the four Justices might be a
minority but that “[t]heir convictions, however, remain unchanged.”)
252. Id. at 572-74.
253. Id. at 572.
254. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 582.
255. Id.
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could judge the necessity of its acts, made the federal government
“practically absolute and unlimited.”256
Chief Justice Chase also focused on the means chosen by
Congress as the most troubling part of the test. He found “no
connection” between the power to coin money and the ability to
make paper a legal tender.257 Indeed, he found the law to be not
just illegitimate but actually counterproductive. He argued that
the making of the paper as legal tender showed the government to
be weak, as an admission by the United States that people would
otherwise not accept them.258
Returning to his argument that both the letter and spirit of
the Constitution forbade the action, Chief Justice Chase again
sought the high ground of originalism. He noted Madison’s
agreement in removing the ban on the federal power to issue notes
because he understood that such notes might have some utility,
but they simply could not be made a legal tender.259 He found a
similar rejection of the scourge of paper money in the absence of
such a power in the Federalist Papers,260 and in Daniel Webster’s
confident assertion that only silver and gold could constitute a
legal tender.261
Justice Clifford added his voice to that of the Chief Justice,
and spoke even more directly from an originalist perspective.262
The founding generation, he reminded listeners, knew “from
bitter experience” the “calamitous effects” of using paper as a
legal tender.263 He tracked the early experiences of the young
constitutional republic to demonstrate that none of the early
Congresses had acted as if they had this power.264 He even
reached into the period before the Constitution, a time that was
important because it was when “all America had come to the
256. Id.
257. Id. at 574.
258. Id. at 579 (noting that by mandating acceptance of the greenbacks, the United
States “virtually declares that it does not expect them to be received without compulsion. It
practically represents itself insolvent”).
259. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 585 (arguing that removing the ability
to emit bills of credit “cut off the pretext for a paper currency”).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 586.
262. See id. at 589-95 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 589.
264. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 590-95.
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conclusion that all the paper currency in circulation was utterly
worthless, and that nothing was fit for a standard of value but gold
and silver coin.”265 He thus found a consistent view of the
question from that critical generation, noting that acts of Congress
before the Constitution and just after it aligned with the
Convention itself; none were interested in allowing the paper
money experiment of the Revolution to be repeated.266 He found
a consistency, too, in Framers who had a wide variety of opinions
in other areas. He quoted Madison,267 he quoted Ellsworth,268 he
even quoted Hamilton.269 He found that the seventy years that
had passed between then and now showed no act by any member
of any body of the government that “affords the slightest support”
to the theory embraced by the majority.270 This was true even
though those decades witnessed “two foreign wars, the creation
of the second national bank, and the greatest financial revulsions
through which our country has ever passed.”271
It was this intent of the Framers that mattered, Justice
Clifford argued in his own dissent, not the convenience or even
necessity of the particular action.272 To argue that somehow
powers merely implied by the war power created such authority
was “a mere waste of words.”273 Congress had the power to
collect taxes, borrow money, and sell public lands; those would
surely be enough.274
Justice Clifford also directly refuted the majority’s notion
that Hepburn was suspect because it was the product of a less than
full Court.275 Like the Chief Justice, Justice Clifford reminded
265. Id. at 595.
266. Id. at 596-98.
267. Id. at 607 (citing Madison for the idea that prohibiting bills of credit would serve
to prevent “making the bills a tender, either for public or private debts”).
268. Id. at 606 (quoting the future Chief Justice as hoping that the ban on bills of credit
would “shut and bar the door against paper money”).
269. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 608 (citing Hamilton’s opposition to
paper money because the government should not be trusted with “so seducing and dangerous
an element”).
270. Id. at 610.
271. Id. at 629.
272. Id. at 633.
273. Id. at 630.
274. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 630-31 (stating that to suggest
those methods were insufficient was “a mere chimera”).
275. See id. at 604.
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the majority that the Court had been legislatively reduced to
eight,276 and that five of those eight had agreed with the Framers
that paper money could not be a legal tender.277
Unafraid to travel ground already at least partially covered
by his colleagues, Justice Field offered a separate dissent as
well.278 Bringing his own distinctive voice to the controversy,
Justice Field went beyond merely citing Hepburn to praising it by
claiming that no previous case had been “more fully argued or
more maturely considered.”279 He then proceeded to calmly work
through a number of styles of constitutional analysis, finding the
majority’s decision hopelessly flawed in every one.
As a textualist, Justice Field argued that the issuing of
greenbacks as currency was perfectly legitimate.280 He found that
it stemmed from the borrowing power, “which is granted to
Congress without limitation.”281 But he denied that this power
would ever allow the government to make the paper currency thus
printed legal tender for private debts.282 The power to borrow
given to the federal government, he argued, was the same as any
individual’s ability to borrow.283 As no individual could dictate
the terms of third-party relationships, the borrowing power of the
federal government could not logically support the legal tender
designation.284 He then dismissed quickly the other claimed
sources of power: “to declare war, to suppress insurrection, to
raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy.”285
He saw the Civil War as having increased the need for funds, but
not the powers vested in Congress, concluding that “[t]he wants

276. The legislative reduction of the Court would not allow any new Justice to be
appointed until the number reached six. Id.
277. See id. at 599-600, 604.
278. Id. at 634 (Field, J., dissenting).
279. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 634. By comparison, he obliquely
insulted the overturning majority, noting “I shall not comment upon the causes which have
led to a reversal of that judgment. They are patent to every one.” Id.
280. See id. at 635-36.
281. Id. at 635.
282. Id. at 638.
283. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 638.
284. See id. at 639 (arguing that nothing within the power to borrow allowed “that the
rights or interests of third parties, strangers to the matter, shall be in any respect affected”).
285. Id. at 648.
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of the government can never be the measure of its powers.”286 He
similarly rejected swiftly any claims that printing money could be
subsumed under coining money, noting not only that coins must
have intrinsic value, but also that the counterfeiting clause
allowed Congress to criminalize both the falsifying of coins and
securities.287
As a structuralist, he denied that Congress even had the
factual power to make paper money a legal tender, at least as to
its face value.288 He cited “the universal law of currency” that
what determined the worth of paper money was not a dictate of
the law but “the confidence which the parties receiving the notes
had in their ultimate payment.”289 He cited not only the
Revolutionary War examples, but also the more recent experience
of the Civil War itself, when the value of the greenbacks
fluctuated not according to acts of Congress but rather to
battlefield successes and setbacks of the Union army.290 Indeed,
he argued that a test of utility would lead to a Congress of
unlimited power, as the greenbacks could be made successful by
an act of Congress providing that “the notes of the government
should serve as a free ticket in the public conveyances of the
country.”291 He noted that no advocate would concede the
appropriateness of that.292 He further argued that the structural
choice to extend an express bankruptcy power to Congress
demonstrated the lack of a more general power to interfere with
private contracts in the way made inevitable by the legal tender
declaration.293
Justice Field even engaged the majority on its preferred
ground of prudentialism. While the Court had insisted that
making paper money a legal tender was something that had to be
286. Id. at 648-49.
287. Id. at 649-50.
288. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 643-44.
289. Id. at 644.
290. Id. at 646 (“[T]he notes of the United States issued under the Legal Tender Act
rose in value in the market as the successes of our arms gave evidence of an early termination
of the war, and that they fell in value with every triumph of the Confederate forces.”).
291. Id. at 643.
292. Id. (harkening back to McCulloch, he noted that not even an “advocate of the most
liberal construction” would suggest that such an act “would be appropriate as a means to the
execution of the power to borrow”).
293. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 663 .
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done for the benefit of the nation, Justice Field invoked “the
demoralizing tendency, the cruel injustice, and the intolerable
oppression of a paper currency.”294 Coupled with the suggestion
that the real success of the greenbacks was attributable solely to
military success, he argued that there was no good reason for
sustaining the claim of power on such utilitarian grounds.295
Where Justice Field was at his most powerful, though, was
in his use of a historical, originalist modality. He cited a Hall of
Fame of voices from the Constitutional Convention, men such as
Morris,296 Ellsworth,297 Butler,298 and Madison himself.299 He
even foresaw Judge Harold Leventhal’s much noted observation
that citing to legislative history was “akin to ‘looking over a
crowd and picking out your friends.’”300
Justice Field
acknowledged that “opinions and intentions of individual
members of the Convention . . . are not to control the construction
of the plain language.”301 Yet he could not help but note that
although “opposite opinions on many points were expressed” in
other areas, that was not true on the paper as legal tender
question.302 Here, on the contrary, there was unanimity not only
in the convention itself but “in the several State conventions and
in the discussions before the people.”303 From this uniformity of
thought, plus the three-quarter century of practice since,304 he
concluded that to set aside such evidence of the intention of the
294. Id. at 652-53.
295. Id. at 653 (claiming that the precious metal “ever has been and always must be
recognized by the world as the true standard” and only that could “facilitate commerce,
protect industry, establish justice, and prevent the possibility of a recurrence of the evils”
brought on by paper money in the Revolutionary era).
296. Id. at 653-54 (noting that it was Morris’s motion to strike the power to “emit bills
on the credit of the United States”).
297. Id. at 654 (quoting Ellsworth’s confidence that “[p]aper money can in no case be
necessary”).
298. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 654 (who observed that “paper was a
legal tender in no country in Europe”).
299. Id. at 654-55.
300. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983).
301. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 655.
302. Id. at 656.
303. Id.
304. Id. Field noted not only the practice—or lack thereof—of using paper money as
legal tender since ratification of the Constitution, but also cited the opinions of members of
the post-framing Hall of Fame such as Daniel Webster. See id. at 659.
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framing generation “would require very clear evidence.”305 No
such evidence appeared in the majority opinion.
As he concluded with a despairing pledge to obey the
Constitution306 amid warnings that Congress now could use this
“constructive power”307 to subject the nation to its “unrestrained
will,”308 it is possible that Justice Field hoped that the damage
might yet be contained. After all, the majority had at least hinted
that the legal tender power grew from the crisis of war, and thus
might not last forever.309
That any such hope was in vain was made plain almost a
decade and a half later. Less than a generation after Mrs. Lee
received paper money for her lost sheep, the controversy appeared
one last time in the Supreme Court. In the 1884 case of Juilliard
v. Greenman the paper money issue ended with barely a
whimper.310
The scene was set by a change of Congressional minds. In
1875, as Reconstruction drew to an end, Congress concluded that
the emergency caused by the war had come to an end. It passed
a law “to provide for the resumption of specie payments,” which
would methodically remove the paper money from circulation.311
Perhaps, as Justice Bradley had predicted, the emergency that
required the government to issue legal tender notes was now past.
Within three years, things had changed. After severe
disruptions of the kind predicted by the majority in Knox v. Lee,
Congress replaced the 1875 act with one forbidding the retirement
of paper money by requiring that that greenbacks traded in for
coins “not be retired, canceled or destroyed, but they shall be
reissued and paid out again and kept in circulation.”312 Any
305. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 667.
306. Id. at 681 (he compared his loyalty to the Constitution to his Christianity, citing
“our great Master” for his requirement to keep his commandments).
307. Id. at 666.
308. Id. at 664.
309. Id. at 540 (majority opinion) (“[A] consideration of the time when they were
enacted, and of the circumstances in which the government then stood, is important.”).
Additionally, Justice Bradley’s concurrence had made this explicit. See Legal Tender Cases,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 561 (Bradley, J., concurring).
310. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
311. Id. at 436-37 (quoting Specie Payment Resumption Act, ch. 15, 18 Stat. 296
(1875)).
312. Id. at 437 (quoting Act of May 31, 1878, ch. 146, 20 Stat. 87).
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language in Knox that was tentative or linked to the war power
was now to be tested.313
The Court yawned. The eight-Justice majority, after noting
that all nine agreed that Knox controlled, proceeded to apply the
extremely deferential version of the McCulloch test that had been
featured in the Knox case.314 The power to borrow money, the
majority held, amply justified the means of making paper as legal
tender.315 Indeed, the Court noted, any determination of when
such a means was appropriate was “a political question, to be
determined by Congress.”316
In one breathtaking display, the majority went significantly
further than the Knox Court had. After emphasizing the powers
of Congress that arose from the absence of the term “expressly”
in the Tenth Amendment’s limitation of powers,317 the Court
reexamined the framing of the Constitution.318 Justice Gray
acknowledged that “[s]ome of the members of the Convention . . .
expressed the strongest opposition to paper money.”319 He
nonetheless made the astonishing claim that the notes of the
Constitutional Convention “afford no proof of any general
concurrence of opinion upon the subject before us.”320 Turning
back to the removal of the “emit bills” section of the borrowing
power and Madison’s claim that it prevented paper being used as
legal tender, Justice Gray took Madison to task for not explaining
why that would be so.321 Finding evidence in the absence of
evidence, he then noted that “it cannot be known how many of the
other delegates, by whose vote the motion was adopted, intended
neither to proclaim nor to deny the power to emit paper

313. That test was, in the words of Professor Fairman, “contrived.” FAIRMAN, supra
note 171, at 771. He noted that the case was orchestrated by opposing members of Congress,
Benjamin Butler and Simeon Chittenden, coordinating a cotton sale between citizens of
different states, with the amount of the sale having been designed to be just over the Supreme
Court’s then-existing jurisdiction limit. Id. at 771-72.
314. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 438.
315. Id. at 449.
316. Id. at 450.
317. Id. at 442.
318. Id.
319. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 443.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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money.”322 As one could not know whether the prohibition on
state issue of paper money was meant to deny Congress that
power,323 and as European countries were now “universally
understood” to have that power as an aspect of sovereignty,324 it
was available to Congress.
Although he was now alone, Justice Field fought on. His
dissent offered little that was new. He insisted that on this point
the intentions of the Framers were known “with moral
certainty.”325 He rejected the comparison to European nations as
irrelevant to a Constitution providing for a limited federal
government.326 He denounced as evil the “fraud, chicanery, and
profligacy” of paper money in the pre-constitutional era.327 He
fretted that the argument that this had been a necessary act of war
was now forsaken and that what was once justified as “the
‘medicine of the Constitution’ has now become its daily
bread.”328
Field made two ominous predictions. One warned that there
would now be no limit on the federal government: “why should
there be any restraint upon unlimited appropriations by the
government for all imaginary schemes of public improvement, if
the printing press can furnish the money that is needed for
them?”329 The other was that the paper money controversy would
not go away, that it would “continue to come until it is settled so
as to uphold and not impair the contracts of parties, to promote
and not defeat justice.”330 That simply did not happen.

322. Id.
323. Id. at 446.
324. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 447.
325. Id. at 451 (Field, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 467.
327. Id. at 452 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1371, at 268 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1883)).
328. Id. at 458.
329. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 470.
330. Id. at 451.
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VII. THE PEOPLE (TACITLY) SPEAK AGAIN: PAPER
MONEY IS CONSTITUTIONAL
An external observer of the United States during the period
of the Greenback cases might well have concluded that Justice
Field was right, and that the struggle would end no time soon.
The observer would be wrong.331 For although a battle would
continue over paper money, it was a significantly different one
that would captivate political movements for the next hundred
years.
The battle over the gold standard, pitting hard money
interests against soft money interests, was certainly related to the
legal tender battle. The battle crossed and re-crossed party
lines:332 President Grant, whose appointees saved paper money,
later stated that he sought a repeal of the Legal Tender Act.333
This statement, coupled with his veto of an 1874 bill to expand
the supply of paper money, had the effect of an explosion that, in
the view of one contemporary, threatened to destroy the
Republican Party.334
But the underlying question, whether legal tender could be
made of paper, was clearly settled. Even the proponents of the
gold standard assumed that the legal tender within the United
States could be more than gold and silver.335 They recognized
that battle to have been lost, and sought simply to avoid forfeiting
even more ground to the soft money interests.336 The American
people then, and ever since, have tacitly assented to this new—if
unwritten—amendment to the Constitution: Congress may now,
when it sees fit, issue paper currency and grant it the status of
legal tender for all private debts.337
Indeed, the brutally complete nature of paper money’s
victory is visible in the remarks of one of the most famous
331. FAIRMAN, supra note 171, at 774 (“Evils which Justice Field predicted did not
arise . . . .”).
332. UNGER, supra note 117, at 172 (noting Democratic opposition to the Republicansponsored Legal Tender Act on constitutional grounds).
333. Id. at 245.
334. Id. at 246.
335. See id. at 229-30.
336. See id. at 234.
337. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTION 27 (1987).
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defenders of originalism of the late twentieth century. When
nominated to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Judge
Robert Bork was already a fierce proponent of originalist ideas.338
Nonetheless, even he recognized the limits of originalism in this
context: “[s]cholarship suggests that the framers intended to
prohibit paper money. Any judge who today thought he would
go back to the original intent really ought to be accompanied by
a guardian rather than be sitting on a bench.”339 Setting aside the
unnecessarily gentle term “suggests,” the problem with the
originalist project appears in full force in this brief moment. As
noted earlier, few scholars of originalism have undertaken the
project of defending paper money as legal tender; with the rare
exception of authors like Professor Natelson,340 most have simply
accepted it as a fait accompli, as Judge Bork did.341 But why
should that be so? Why, precisely, should a judge be committed
to a guardianship for recognizing that the language of the
Constitution, the intent of its authors, and the understanding of
the people of its day all make clear that paper money is
unacceptable? Why should the will of Reconstruction-era
Americans, which was never formalized through the Article V
process, affect the meaning of the Constitution?
CONCLUSION
Assuming that Judge Bork was right to surrender Justice
Field’s unsuccessful struggle, what lessons are available to the
modern student of the Constitution? Must we begin a quixotic
crusade to undo a century and a half of fiscal reality? If not, have
we broken faith with our Constitution? Or does Madison offer us
a way forward?
One way to view the Constitution is as an operational
document, one that gave birth to a living organism of

338. Mark A. Graber, Robert Bork, the Original Originalist, BALT. SUN (Dec. 24,
2012), [https://perma.cc/C436-WFBK].
339. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 113 (1989)
[hereinafter Bork Nomination] (statement of J. Robert Bork, nominee).
340. See supra note 46.
341. Bork Nomination, supra note 339, at 113.
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governance.342 The life of that government has resulted in
changes to it and not all of those are contained in formal
amendments to the birth document.343 If James Madison was
right that the tacit assent of the people solves the Jeffersonian
problem of rule by the dead, that assent must provide a place for
unwritten amendments. Such amendments, ratified by the
behavior of generations of Americans, demonstrate their
consent.344 Such amendments and alterations cannot be removed
by an originalist project designed to restore features put aside by
today’s United States, at least if republicanism is to have meaning
for the living. To insist otherwise is to remove any current
relevance of the idea of consent of the governed.
There is little doubt that the Constitution does not textually
provide the power to make paper money into legal tender. There
is little doubt that the drafters of the Constitution intended to
prevent paper money from gaining the status of legal tender.
There is little doubt that the original public meaning of the
document, followed for generations thereafter, concurred. But
when the needs of the Civil War demanded a solution that could
be offered by precisely this legal tender designation, the
government granted it. The people consented. When the
Supreme Court initially rejected this unwritten amendment to the
written Constitution, the people treated it as a temporary
aberration. Their patience was rewarded a year later, when the
Court reversed itself and acceded to the demands of the nation.
That decision the country accepted. More importantly, the people
of the United States today show their continued assent with every
paper money private transaction they make.
That fact
demonstrates the remarkably long-lasting level of consent to this
unwritten change to the Constitution.
Thomas Jefferson warned us that the dead had no right to
exercise control over the living.345 James Madison noted in

342. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“[W]hen we are dealing with
words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must
realize that they have called into life a being . . . .”).
343. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Change, supra note 26, at 497-98.
344. See Madison, supra note 14, at 24.
345. Jefferson, supra note 9, at 395-96.
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response that the living might well avoid the chaos of anarchy by
granting their consent tacitly to the structures erected by the dead
by continuing to use them.346 The wisdom of both of these men
demonstrates the lasting value of the legal tender cases and the
fundamental flaw in originalism. The continuing consent of a
century and a half of practice have ratified the Civil War
amendment that granted an unwritten power to Congress,
validating a power over legal tender that would have horrified the
authors and ratifiers of the Constitution. To set aside the
generations of consent, including current consent, in favor of
restoring the original meaning of the document is to denigrate the
very idea of republicanism. Even if the project of originalism to
eliminate unwritten amendments was attainable, the commitment
to the consent of the governed would stand in its way.

346. See Madison, supra note 14, at 24.

